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The Normativity of Rationality 
Nicholas Shackel  
 
Forthcoming in Theorema 
 
Abstract: Rationality appears to have some intimate relation with normativity: exactly 
what relation is in dispute. John Broome devotes a chapter of his recent book to rebutting 
the view that rationality has 'true normativity', which he equates with the kind of 
normativity that I call directivity. In particular, he offers a number of arguments against 
derivative accounts of the normativity of rationality. In this paper I defend my 
instrumentalist account from those arguments. In so doing I bring into view the grounds 
of a live positive defence of UDWLRQDOLW\¶VVHUYDQWKRRGWRGLUHFWLYLW\. 
 
7KHQRUPDWLYLW\RIUDWLRQDOLW\LVQRWWKHFHQWUDOWRSLFRI-RKQ%URRPH¶VUHFHQWERRN
Rationality through Reasoning, which is mainly concerned with how through being 
rational we come to intend what we believe we ought. It is, however, the focus of an 
important and interesting chapter in which Broome rebuts the view that rationality has 
'true normativit\¶,QSDUWLFXODUKHRIIHUVDQXPEHURIDUJXPHQWVDJDLQVWGHULYDWLYH
accounts of the normativity of rationality. In this paper I defend my derivative account 
from those arguments and bring into view the grounds of a live positive argument for 
what I call the servanthood of rationality to directive normativity.  
Rationality appears to have some intimate relation with normativity. Indeed, there is a 
view on which the normativity of rationality is a trivial matter since rationality just is part 
or all of normativity. Suppose that rationality is reasoned, by which I mean that being 
rational is a matter of acting and believing in accord with reasons. Adding to this the 
analysis of some or all normativity in terms of reasons, or vice versa, suffices for the 
triviality. Broome devotes chapter four of his book to analysing reasons in terms of 
normativity and rejects the triviality by devoting chapter five to rebutting the proposition 
that rationality is reasoned.  
Granted that rationality is not reasoned the question of its exact relation to normativity 
arises. The question takes its interest at least in part from the normative conflicts that 
rationality can get into. Rationality is apparently normative and yet this appearance can be 
shown to be in tension with apparently evident normative truths, such as that believing 
you ought is not sufficient to make you right, to make it true that you ought. We have this 
rather swift argument to the conflict. Rationality isLQ%URRPH¶VWHUPV a source of 
requirements, in particular, the source of the requirement of central interest to Broome in 
his book, the requirement to intend what you believe you ought.1 Requirements are 
normative. Therefore rationality is normative. So you ought to do what is rationally 
required.2 So you ought to intend whatever you believe you ought.  
This is the well known danger of bootstrapping rightness out of mere rationality. Any 
account of the normativity of rationality must block this argument and there are, of 
course, a number ways it can be blocked. Many, including Broome, would say there is an 
illicit appeal to a narrow-scope modal principle when only the wide-scope principle is 
true.3 Others have argued that even the wide-VFRSHSULQFLSOHGRHVQ¶WKHOS.4  
                                                 
1
 See Broome 2013:192 for his precise definition of the enkratic requirement. 
2
 See for example Dancy 2009:105, Way 2010:1058. 
3
 See Dancy 1977; Bratman 1987; Broome 2001; Kolodny 2005; Rippon 2011 
4
 See Greenspan 1975:265, Dancy 2009:103-5. 
 2 
7RJHWFOHDURQ%URRPH¶VSRVLWLRQDERXWWKH normativity of rationality we need to be 
clear about his position on normativity in general. %URRPHDFNQRZOHGJHVDµZLGHVHQVHRI
µQRUPDWLYH¶IRUZKLFKµUHTXLUHPHQWVRIDQ\VRUWDUHQRUPDWLYH¶EXWWKLVLVQRWWKHVHQVHKH
is interested in. He is interesteGLQWKHVHQVHZKLFKµhelps determine what you ought to 
GR«ZKDW,FDOO« µWUXHQRUPDWLYLW\¶¶2013:27). I distinguish these senses by the terms 
µFRUUHFWQHVV¶DQGµGLUHFWLYLW\¶5 and Broome apparently concurs with the way I draw the 
distinction (2013:27 fn.31). In the face of the need to draw these distinctions Broome has 
settled on the same regimentation of terminology as myself (Shackel 2004:26-7) in 
UHVHUYLQJµUHTXLUHPHQW¶and cognates for correctness normativity, DQGµRXJKW¶ and 
µUHDVRQV¶for directive normativity. Consequently, Broome does not µXVH³UHTXLUHV´ as a 
QRUPDWLYHWHUP¶Broome 2013:192) in the directive sense when speaking of rational 
requirements. So when thinking about the normativity of rationality in the sense of 
interest we must go beyond the mere correctness had by requirements of any sort and 
consider its relation to true normativity, to directivity.6  
Broome defines the Normativity of Rationality thus: 
Necessarily, if rationality requires N to F, that fact is a reason for N to F. 
(Broome 2013:192) 
Broome holds this to be true and thereby holds rationality to be directive. Nevertheless, 
having devoted chapter 11 to considering and rejecting arguments in its favour he 
confesses to having no argument for it. I, on the other hand, think it to be false and that 
whilst rationality is directive, LWLVQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\GLUHFWLYH. Furthermore, in general, I think 
LWVEHLQJGLUHFWLYHLVDQH[WULQVLFUDWKHUWKDQLQWULQVLFIHDWXUHWRSXWLWLQ%URRPH¶VWHUPV
the fact of rationality requiring N to F can only be a reason derivatively.7 This is so 
because the non-derivative determinants of what one ought are not themselves 
requirements or ends of rationality. Hence, that something is rationally required does not 
suffice to make the fact of it being rationally required a reason. It is only a reason if, 
through some possibly quite indirect route, being rational in this way is necessary or an 
aid to doing what one ought. This is part of what I call the servanthood of rationality to 
directive normativity. ,VKDOOGLVFXVV%URRPH¶VDUJXPHQWVDJDLQVWUDWLRQDOLW\Eeing 
derivatively normative below. 
Broome considers a view he calls 
Strong Normativity.  Necessarily, if rationality requires N to F, then N ought 
to F because rationality requires N to F. (Broome 2013:192) 
We both reject this, yet for very different reasons. Broome rejects it because he thinks that 
the fact of rationality requiring N to F is pro tanto, not pro toto, and hence can be 
outweighed, for example, if believing a contradiction were to prevent a war. I reject it 
because I think in the end it must be understood as originating in a radically different view 
of rationality, a view in which rationality is not the servant but the master of directive 
normativity.8 &RQVLGHUIRUH[DPSOH'DUZDOO¶VDSSURDFK 
                                                 
5
 See Shackel 2004, 2014, MS-b. I intend a different distinction from that drawn by Thomson 
(2008) with similar terminology. Her distinction between correctness properties and directives 
lines up with the standard distinction between the evaluative and the deontic. 
6
 In these terms, the second premiss of the swift argument is equivocal and the inference to the 




VRXUFH¶Broome 2013:197).  
8
 7KHUHLVDFRPSOLFDWLRQRYHU5RVV¶VDSSDUHQWGHIHQFHRIStrong Normativity because he says he 
LVRQO\GHIHQGLQJLWDVµRXJKW¶LQµa QRUPDWLYHVHQVH¶Ross 2012:139). He seems to intend 
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It is part of the very idea of the Rational Normative System that its norms 
are finally authoritative in settling questions of what to do (1990:215)  
The problem I find with this is that if such a Rational Normative System is convincing as 
finally authoritative it is unconvincing as a characterisation of rationality. Directive 
normativity is what is finally authoritative of what to do: that is simply part of what the 
WHUPµGLUHFWLYHQRUPDWLYLW\¶RU%URRPH¶VµWUXHQRUPDWLYLW\¶LVWKHUHWRUHIHUWR. So 
'DUZDOO¶VSURSRVDODPRXQWVWRGHILQLQJGLUHFWLYHQRUPDWLYLW\DVWKHRXWSXWRIUDWLRQDOLW\  
Intuitively, what is finally authoritative about what to do is the intricate dance of morality, 
virtue, prudence and aesthetics, which is to say, ethics broadly construed. To put the point 
against Darwall very swiftly, is something ethical because it is rational or is it rational 
because it is ethical? Taking the first horn, it seems plain to me that what I mean by 
rationality, the capacity to have and pursue goals in the light of information, and its 
constitutive and success norms, which correspond to the kinds of requirements Broome 
calls rational requirement, are insufficient to generate the requirements of ethics. (Here is 
not the place to examine the many attempts by rationalists to square this circle.) On the 
other horn, this is defining rationality in terms of the ethical. It is true that some people 
XVHWKHZRUGµUDWLRQDO¶LQWKLVZD\ZKHUHLWLVjust another way of talking of the ethical 
(and on this use, rationality is indeed reasoned). But that use has nothing to do with 
requirements such as taking means to ends, believing in accordance with the evidence, 
KDYLQJFRQVLVWHQWEHOLHIVDQGVRRQ&DOOLQJLWµVXEVWDQWLYH UDWLRQDOLW\¶Goes not get round 
this problem. Indeed, I find it misleading because it seeks to help itself to the rationalist¶s 
answer to why be moral (because it is rational and you are already committed to being 
rational because of what you are) whilst begging the question. 
Broome also considers a view he calls  
Weak Normativity. Necessarily, if rationality requires N to F, there is a 
reason for N to F. (Broome 2013:193) 
This is a view he finds unsatisfactory because  
it is not a version of the claim that rationality is normative. It associates 
rationality with normativity, but it does not say that rationality is a source of 
normative requirements. (Broome 2013:193) 
Although I think it untrue, I do not find it unsatisfactory for this reason. In general I am 
interested in giving a true account of the relation of the correctness normativity of 
rationality to directive normativity. Specifically, I am interested in whether, when, and 
why you ought to be rational. If the answer to that is, in some particular cases, that there is 
a reason to do what rationality requires of you although that rationality requires it is not 
the reason, I am not greatly troubled. This is because the position I wish to defend about 
the normativity of rationality is the 
Servanthood of Rationality to Directivity:  
1. availing rational guidance: what is rational for you is validly first 
personally predicable as rationally required; 
2. directive harmony of rational guidance: when you are as you ought to be 
then what is rational for you to do will be what you ought to do. 
                                                                                                                                                  
directive normativity but if he would be satisfied to mean correctness normativity then he is 
discussing a different proposition from the one under consideration here. I agree with that 
GLIIHUHQWSURSRVLWLRQEXWLWLVDWULYLDOLW\EHFDXVHXVLQJµRXJKW¶LQDFRUUHFWQHVVVHQVHLVMXVW
another way of registering a requirement. 
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For example, I can believe that I ought to help a friend and validly conclude intending to 
help him is rationally required of me; provided I value and desire as I ought to (care about 
the right things in the right way) and have true beliefs, then it will be true that I ought to 
intend to help him. In this way the correctness normativity of rationality is available to 
guide me and in being available to me it also guides me to what is directively normative 
provided I care rightly. Furthermore, all that is required here is local knowledge of what is 
rationally required, local right motivation,  local true valuing and local true belief, where 
the extent of the locality will be determined by the actions at issue.  
The way this position works is that rather than trying to show rationality itself to be 
directive or worrying that it needs to be intrinsically directive, it appeals to the possibility 
of the internal accessible rational order corresponding to and representing the (possibly 
external) ethical order. The internally available correctness normativity of rationality will 
line up with and thereby represent the external directive normativity in those localities 
where we care rightly. Where this harmony is in place doing what is rational, which we 
can know, will be doing what is right, which we may not know. We can know this last 
proposition about rationality by philosophical reflection and thereby know generally 
whether, when and why we ought to be rational. This may be as good as we can get for an 
account of the obligation to be rational.  
We must not expect more precision than the subject-PDWWHUDGPLWV«We 
must be contentWKHQ«WRLQGLFDWHWKHWUXWKURXJKO\DQGLQRXWOLQHDQGLQ
speaking about things which are only for the most part true (Aristotle 
1989:1094b) 
The obligation iVJHQHUDOµIRUWKHPRVWSDUW¶EXWQRWXQLYHUVDO. When it comes to 
particular cases, whether we will know it to be one in which we ought to be rational 
depends on whether we know that we care rightly and know what is rational to do for 
what we care about. 2IWHQZHZRQ¶WNQRZZKHWKHUZHFDUHULJKWO\DQGVRZRQ¶WNQRZ
whether we ought to do what we know to be rationally required. We will only know that 
generally we are obliged to be rational and the explanation just given for that general 
obligation. 
These last remarks make clear the instrumentalism in the position: where we are in 
harmony, being rational is a means to acting rightly. This and the extent to which, when 
caring rightly, being rational may be necessary to doing what you ought, also means the 
position may have some dependence on what I call transmissivism (roughly, that the 
correctness normativity of rationality is compatible with the transmission of directivity 
from, for example, ends to means).9 
There is a variety of Servanthood I call Weak Servanthood, that is just as satisfiable by 
a reason for whatever is rationally required as by the fact of it being rationally required 
being itself a reason.10 There is also a position I call Strong Servanthood that claims we 
can build on Servanthood by arguing that the general obligation to be rational is itself 
usually a reason to conform to rational requirements, thereby making the fact of each such 
requirement a reason as well. 
                                                 
9
 More technically, transmissivism is that the normative relations of rationality to directivity are 
unfocused transmitting relations (Shackel MS-a). 
10
 There are complications I am skating over due to the slackness (as Broome 1999 puts it) of 
reDVRQVDQGWKHVWULFWQHVVRIWKHµRXJKW¶VLQdirective harmony of rational guidance. They are not 
germane to the point here although they are important for vindicating the position as a whole.  
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It is not my purpose here to offer a general defence of the Servanthood. Rather, I shall 
ORFDWHWKHSRVLWLRQLQFRQWUDVWWR%URRPH¶VDQGWKHQFRQVLGHUDUJXPHQWVRIIHUHGE\
Broome that may be problematic for this kind of position.  
%URRPH¶VNormativity of Rationality means that rationality is globally normative, that 
for each rational requirements there is always a reason for doing whatever is rationally 
required. I think rationality is only locally normative, that for some rational requirements 
on some occasions there is a reason. Broome thinks the fact of being a rational 
requirement is itself a reason (Normativity of Rationality). I think the fact of being a 
rational requirement may itself be a reason but most difficulties for Servanthood do not 
turn on the kind of distinction that Broome is drawing between the Normativity of 
Rationality and Weak Normativity.  Broome is skeptical of transmission principles (see 
Broome 2013:126) so probably thinks that transmissivism is false whereas I think it true. 
Broome thinks that rationality is non-derivatively normative (Broome 2013:204), I think 
that it is derivatively normative.  
The last contrast may be somewhat misleading since by this point the earlier contrasts 
play into what we mean by rationality being or not being derivatively normative. 
Furthermore, our different interests here may mean we are looking for quite different 
things in attempting to address the general issue of the normativity of rationality. Broome 
may think that Servanthood GRHVQ¶WJRIDUHQRXJKEHFDXVHLWGRHVQ¶Wentail that rationality 
as a whole is directively normative; whereas I think Normativity of Rationality is not 
needed to explain the nature of obligations to be rational. Servanthood, especially Weak 
Servanthood, is constructed to concede and steer round rather than solve many of the 
conflicts of normativity that undermine positions like the Normativity of Rationality, and 
to do so whilst continuing to offer an account of the obligation to be rational. 
Nevertheless, LI%URRPH¶VDUJXPHQWVDJDLQVWGHULYDWLYHQRUPDWLYLW\DQGWUDQVPLVVLRQRI
normativity from means to ends are right, prima facie they rule out Servanthood by ruling 
out all positions of that kind. For that reason we shall now turn to considering those 
arguments.  
)RUWKHVDNHRIDWDUJHWLQP\SRVLWLRQWKDWLVPRUHFOHDUO\LQ%URRPH¶VVLJKWVZHZLOO
take it that Servanthood commits me to this position: 
(Rationality) Sometimes Normative: sometimes, if rationality requires N to 
F, that fact is a reason for N to F. 
This is harder to refute than  Normativity of Rationality just because the latter is 
universally quantified and the former is existentially quantified.  
I will concede now, but not attempt to address here, that there are problems for me if I 
am so committed. For example, I do not think that such reasons should be weighed in the 
balance with the non-derivative determinants of what one ought and perhaps that means 
WKH\FDQ¶WEHUHDVRQVDWDOO. I think it can be got round by derivative reasons being self-
effacing in the face of the non-derivative, and thereby avoid double-counting (and in any 
case, double-counting is a problem for everyone)%XWPD\EHLWFDQ¶W and I have to retreat 
to Weak Servanthood. Much depends here on the normative status of general (as opposed 
to universal) obligations and their relation to their instances, an issue we will touch on 
below. 
Arguments against derivative normativity for rationality 
The way Broome considers rationality being derivatively normative is as a means: 
Rationality seHPVSODXVLEO\DJRRGPHDQVRI« achieving much of what you 
ought to achieve. (Broome 2013:197) 
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He distinguishes two strategies for arguing for Normativity of Rationality. The direct 
strategy is a bottom up strategy: to argue that each rational requirement individually is 
derivatively normative. The indirect strategy is a top down strategy, to argue that 
rationality as a whole is derivatively normative and this entails Normativity of Rationality. 
The direct strategy 
Broome offers two objections to the direct strategy. The first is that  
often when rationality requires you to F, Fing achieves nothing you have any 
reason to achieve, stemming from any source apart from rationality (Broome 
2013:197-8) 
I agree with this, but the reason it is true is that the cases in which it is true are cases of 
false belief or caring wrongly and so they do not trouble Servanthood. Nor does it trouble 
Weak Servanthood since that would require showing that doing what rationality requires 
never achieves something you have a reason to achieve and this is obviously false. Nor 
does it trouble Sometimes Normative since that requires showing that any reasons to do 
what rationality requires are not rational requirements. 
The second objection is that  
even when satisfying a requirement of rationality does achieve something 
\RXKDYHDUHDVRQWRDFKLHYH«ZHVWLOOFDQQRWFRQFOXGHWKDWWKHUHTXLUHPHQW
is normative   (Broome 2013:198) 
The example Broome uses to illustrate this is the well known Dutch book argument for 
conforming degrees of belief to axioms of probability. A Bayesian requirement of degrees 
of belief for a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive propositions is that they should 
add up to 1. We take this to be a rational requirement. An argument for conforming to it is 
WKDWLI\RXGRQ¶WWKHQ\RXZLOOEHUDWLRQDOO\FRPPLWWHGWRDFFHSWLQJDVHWRIEHWVZKLFK
guarantee you will lose money whatever happens (which set is called a Dutch book).  
The problem with this argument, as Broome sees it, is that  
even if rationality did not require you to have degrees of belief that add up 
to one, you would still have just the same prudential reason to do so. 
(Broome 2013:199) 
  He draws a contrast with law, where  
If the law did not require you to pay taxes, you would have no prudential 
reason to do so. (Broome 2013:199) 
So here, the fact of the law is a reason (derivative from prudence) because its absence 
would entail no reason whereas the absence of the rational requirement would not entail 
no reason. He concludes from this that the fact of it being rationally required is not itself a 
reason and hence, whilst this may support Weak Normativity it does not support Strong 
Normativity.  
There are some difficulties that can be raised for this objection.  
First: the rationality counterfactual is one with a necessarily false antecedent. Such 
counterpossibles are philosophically contentious. For examSOHRQ/HZLV¶VVHPDQWLFV
%URRPH¶VFRXQWHUSRVVLEOHLVWUXHEXWVRLVµLIUDWLRQDOLW\GLGQRWUHTXLUH\RXWRKDYH
degrees of belief that add up to one, you would not still have just the same prudential 
UHDVRQWRGRVR¶ So this will mean we have an antimony: %URRPH¶VDUJXPHQWfrom his 
counterpossible to concluding that the fact of the rational requirement is not a reason and 
an argument from my counterpossible by reasoning parallel to the law case, that it is a 
reason.  
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Second: consider the view Bayesians have of degrees of belief and why they make the 
antecedent necessarily false. )RUH[DPSOHLQ5DPVH\¶VZD\RIWKLQNLQJRIWKHP(Ramsey 
1926) degrees of belief are theoretical items in a scientific theory of mind that are 
calculable from a sufficient extent of knowledge of dispositions for conditional bets. The 
utilities that constitute the prudential reasons in this view are similarly theoretical items in 
that theory, and are similarly and simultaneously calculable from the same knowledge. 
%URRPH¶VREMHFWLRQhas some plausibility provided the prudential reasons are distinct 
existences from the degrees of belief and the rational requirements that apply to them. On 
5DPVH\¶VYLHZKRZHYHUWKH\DUHQRWGLVWLQFWH[LVWHQFHV Consequently it is not clear that 
you can separate the prudential considerations being a reason from the rational 
requirement on degrees of belief. It is not merely that the antecedent is necessarily false. 
The reason it is necessarily false is because degrees of belief and utilities are correlate law 
cluster concepts and so the rational requirement and the prudential reason are 
metaphysically conjoined. So this constitutes an argument for my counterpossible, from 
which we can argue that the rational requirement is a reason. 
Third: why exactly does the prudential reason remaining intact given the (impossible) 
DEVHQFHRIWKHUDWLRQDOUHTXLUHPHQWPHDQWKDWWKHUDWLRQDOUHTXLUHPHQWFDQ¶WEH
derivatively a reason given its necessary presence. I take it the contrast with the legal 
example is supposed to illuminate this. It may be true that the absence of the prudential 
reason in the absence of the legal requirement shows the requirement itself to be 
derivatively a reason. Yet that is not sufficient to show that if the prudential reason to do 
something remains intact in the absence of a requirement to do that thing, the requirement 
to do that something cannot be derivatively a reason when it is present. That would 
require that, for the requirement to be a derivative reason, necessarily, the only reason the 
prudential reason is in place is because of the requirement. But it seems perfectly possible 
for the prudential reason to be in place in some cases for other reasons and to be in place 
in the presence of the requirement for those other reasons and because of the requirement.  
Finally: is the law counterfactual true and does it really make the law the reason? For 
example, suppose the law did not require you to pay taxes but the government and legal 
system behaved as if it did. Then you would still have the prudential reason despite the 
absence of the law. Conversely, if the law did require you to pay taxes but the government 
and legal system EHKDYHGDVLI\RXGLGQ¶W\RXZRXOGQ¶WKDYHWKHSUXGHQWLDOUHDVRQ6o 
perhaps it is not the law that is the reason but how the government and legal system 
behave. %XWWKDWPHDQVZHGRQ¶WKDYHDUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWLVderivatively a reason to 
contrast with WKH%D\HVLDQUDWLRQDOUHTXLUHPHQWWRSURYHWKDW%URRPH¶VFRXQWHUSRVVLEOH
entails that it is the prudential reason alone that is a reason.  
Of these points, I think the second is the most important because it turns on the extent 
to which the substance of rationality matters in defending derivative normativity for 
rationality. Broome is considering examples in which the defence depends on formal 
features and we shall see this possibility of replying to his objections by appeal to the 
substance of rationality recurring below. That being said, this specific example is a 
problem neither for Servanthood nor for Weak Servanthood. 
Indirect strategy 
The indirect strategy is the top down strategy of showing that rationality as a whole 
being derivatively normative entails Normativity of Rationality. %URRPH¶VFRQVLGHUVWKH
indirect strategy in two versions, one in which rationality as a whole is interpreted as µa 
rational GLVSRVLWLRQ«.a disposition that FDXVHV\RXWRVDWLVI\PDQ\UDWLRQDOUHTXLUHPHQWV¶
DQGWKHRWKHULQZKLFKLWLVLQWHUSUHWHGDVµWKHSURSHUW\RIUDWLRQDOLW\«WKHSURSHUW\\RX
KDYHZKHQ\RXVDWLVI\DOOWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIUDWLRQDOLW\¶Broome 2013:199-200).  
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Rational disposition argument 
%URRPHDVVXPHVWKDWµDUDWLRQDOGLVSRVLWLRn is part of the best means of achieving much 
RIZKDW\RXRXJKWWRDFKLHYH¶Broome 2013: 200). He also assumes that a transmission 
principle applies in this case11 so that this entails that you ought to have a rational 
disposition. What is needed for Normativity of Rationality is that from this we can derive 
that each rational requirement is a reason. The only argument he considers to be available 
here is that, since you ought to have a rational disposition and a rational disposition will 
cause you to satisfy individual rational requirements, so you have a reason to satisfy such 
requirements. The quantification over rational requirement satisfyings caused would need 
to be universal here which is empirically doubtful but not the problem that worries 
Broome. Broome thinks that, granted the derivation, ZHWKHUHE\VKRZµWKHUHDVRQ
muVW«EHWKDWLWLVDUHTXLUHPHQWRIUDWLRQDOLW\¶Broome 2013: 201) and hence have got 
what we need for Normativity of Rationality rather than Weak Normativity. 
%URRPH¶Vobjection to this argument is that it is not generally valid that if you ought to 
do something and doing it will cause something else then you have a reason for that other 
thing. For example 
Suppose you ought to take some drug to cure your serious disease. Suppose 
the drug has the side effect of causing you to feel unsteady. It does not 
follow that you have a reason to feel unsteady. (Broome 2013: 201) 
Now this is quite right so far as it goes. Furthermore, it plainly applies to each argument 
for each rational requirement and hence poses a problem for Sometimes Normative as well 
as for Normativity of Rationality. Nevertheless, something more can be said in defence of 
the argument. We can appeal to the specificities of the relation of a rational disposition 
and rational requirements and point out the disanalogy between that case and the drug 
case.  
A closer analogy would be one in which the drug causes specific curative effects and in 
such a case it does follow that you have a reason to undergo each of those specific 
curative effects. Likewise, defending Sometimes Normative from the normativity of a 
rational disposition is not wanting to claim that just anything that is caused by a rational 
disposition is something you have a reason to do but only things essentially related to that 
disposition, namely, satisfying rational requirements. So the inference from the 
normativity of a rational disposition to having a reason to satisfy at least some rational 
requirement depends not only on the satisfaction being caused but also on the nature of 
what is caused. What is caused must belong to a set of satisfyings of requirements which, 
because of the essential relation, were you not to instantiate enough of (given the stimulus 
conditions) you would not have the disposition that you ought to have.  
At this point, if this argument is to work we need to make an inference from the general 
to the particular. Since you must satisfy enough rational requirements in the face of the 
relevant stimulus conditions if you are to have the rational disposition you ought, for at 
least some specific rational requirements there is a reason to satisfy them. This would get 
us Sometimes Normative. We may also make a similar move to the one mentioned above 
that takes us from Servanthood to Strong Servanthood. That you ought to satisfy the 
rational disposition is itself, for each rational requirement, and because of the essential 
dependence and causal relation, a reason to satisfy that rational requirement. This gets us 
Normativity of Rationality. 
                                                 
11
 6HWWLQJDVLGHKLVUHVHUYDWLRQWKDWµ,NQRZQRSULQFLSOHWKDW correctly 
VSHFLILHVKRZQRUPDWLYLW\LVWUDQVPLWWHGIURPHQGVWRPHDQV¶Broome 2013: 200) 
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This argument has two important components: first, an appeal to what is constitutively 
necessary due to an essential relation and transmission of normativity on that basis; 
second, a non-deductive inference from the general to the particular of a contentious kind 
that I nevertheless hold can be a good inference when applied like this to normativity. In 
objecting to the second indirect strategy Broome objects to moves very similar to these 
components so I shall discuss them further below rather than here. In the meantime I 
finish here by noting that the defence of some variety of derivative normativity for 
rationality from a rational disposition being a best means remainsFRQWUDU\WR%URRPH¶V
conclusion, a live argument²although subject, certainly, to further discussion of these 
contendable components.  
Property of rationality argument 
In the second indirect strategy we assume that you ought to be rational in the sense of 
having the property of rationality (the property of satisfying all rational requirements) and 
then seek to derive that each rational requirement is a reason. Having the property of 
rationality means you satisfy each rational requirement. In this case the relation between 
rationality as a whole and the rational requirements is a logical rather than causal relation 
(as it was in the last case). The argument for Normativity of Rationality would run thus: 
since you ought to have the property of rationality and logically necessarily if you have 
that property you satisfy each rational requirement, so you have a reason to satisfy each 
rational requirement. This argument uses a principle of necessary inheritance, O(B)฀฀฀( 
B฀A)฀ O(A), combined with a principle that oughts imply reasons. 
Broome objects 
the new pattern of deduction is questionable, for the same reason as End to 
Means Transmission on page 126 is questionable. Suppose you ought to buy 
a can of paint and decorate your kitchen. It follows by this pattern of 
deduction that you ought to buy a can of paint. But suppose you are not 
going to decorate your kitchen; you have no intention of doing so, and you 
will not do it. Then it seems obvious that there may be no reason for you to 
buy a can of paint. If you are not going to decorate your kitchen, it may be 
entirely pointless to buy one. This example suggests the pattern of deduction 
is invalid. (Broome 2013: 202) 
7KLVLVFORVHO\UHODWHGWR&DVWDQHGD¶VSDUDGR[RIWKHVHFRQGEHVWSODQCastañeda 1989) 
and the cases offered by Carlson (1999) and others. Cases of this kind pose a problem for 
principles such as the distributive principle, O(A฀B)฀O(A)฀O(B), by making it appear  
that O(A฀B) can be true whilst O(A) is false. Grant for the sake of argument a teleological 
principle, that best is what ought to be, and the best outcome is got if A฀B, the second 
best if ¬A฀¬B, and the worst if A฀¬B. We are to suppose that the relevant agent could B, 
but will not, and given this, even if O(A฀B) is true, it looks like O(¬A) is true and 
therefore O(A) is false.12 Since necessarily A฀B฀A the cases can thereby be shown to 
pose problems for necessary inheritance, O(B)฀฀฀( B฀A)฀ O(A), the pattern of 
deduction Broome is objecting to. I have a solution to this kind of problem and I shall 
sketch it briefly.  
I think deontic reasoning is essentially practical, and that any deontic logic must reflect 
this fact. For brevity, I here considHUGHRQWLFORJLFRQO\LQWHUPVRIPRUDOµRXJKWV¶2Q
                                                 
12
 The final inference can be argued about, but ¬O(A) can perhaps be supported directly from 
A฀¬B being worst, and in any case, the semantics I shall shortly outline make both O(¬A) and 
¬O(A) false so I shall not trouble with the status of the final inference. 
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pain of abandoning moral reasoning because utopia is inaccessible to us, seeking to 
choose morally proper futures from futures available to us is a task relative to a world at a 
time (and to an agent, but we do not need to worry about that relativity here). This  truth 
means that our semantics for the ought operator, in using an accessibility relation over 
possible worlds, makes morally proper worlds those that are as they ought to be given 
where you are VWDUWLQJIURPQRWDVWKH\RXJKWWREHLQVRPHDEVROXWHVHQVH,IZHGRQ¶W
GRWKDWGHRQWLFORJLFZRQ¶WUHIOHFWthe fact that moral reasoning is often reasoning about 
how to make the best of a bad job when making the best of a bad job is what we must 
often do. 
Morally proper worlds relative to a world at a time, W(t), are worlds accessible from 
W(t) which are as they ought to be, given W(t). All other worlds accessible from W(t) are 
fallen worlds relative to W(t). We can also have a notion of conditionally morally proper 
worlds relative to W(t). Consider worlds accessible from W(t) given that P is true. 
Conditionally morally proper worlds relative to W(t) and conditional on P, are morally 
proper worlds relative to W(t)|P.13 
When we are considering what is true at W(t), Q true in all morally proper worlds 
accessible from W(t) means O(Q)14 is true at W(t). R true in all morally proper worlds 
accessible from W(t)|P means O(R)|P is true at W(t) and also that O(R) is true at W(t)|P.  
If O(A฀B) is true at a world at a time, W(t), then in every morally proper world 
accessible from W(t), A฀B is true, so A is true in each such world, so O(A). What is now 
significant is that in every morally proper world accessible from W(t), B is true. So any 
world in which ¬B is true is not a morally proper world accessible from W(t). Therefore 
W(t)|¬B and its descendants are all fallen worlds. Since in all the descendants of the fallen 
worlds W(t)|¬B, those in which ¬A is true are better than those in which A is true, in all 
the conditionally morally proper worlds accessible from W(t)|¬B, ¬A is true, therefore 
O(¬A)|¬B is true at W(t), and O(¬A) is at W(t)|¬B.  
So true at W(t) are O(A฀B), O(A), O(B),  and O(¬A)|¬B. O(¬A) is not true, neither is 
¬O(A), although O(¬A)|¬B  and ¬O(A)|¬B are true. However, neither of the latter conflict 
with O(A) and so this does not undermine the principle O(A฀B)฀O(A)฀O(B).  
O(¬A) is made to seem true by conflating two distinct bases for action. In deciding 
what to do you must base it on everything that you know. If all you know is W(t), then the 
only unconditional obligations that face you are O(A฀B), O(A), O(B). When whether B is 
not under your control, and you happen to know that although regrettable, ¬B will be the 
case, then it is perfectly proper to base your action on W(t)|¬B rather than W(t). If you 
know ¬B, then you know that the morally proper worlds are unreachable, and so you must 
base your action on the conditionally or second best morally proper worlds. So you cease 
to be concerned with what is true at W(t), and instead are concerned with what is true at 
                                                 
13
 I think the general idea is clear, but this may need some clarification. To get W(t)|P  we may 
need to consider the W(t)+P where + is an updating operator, usually conjunction except when 
some incompatibility holds between W(t) and P. The properties of a belief revision operator, such 
as the Alchourrón et al 1985 belief revision operator, might do the required job. When + is not 
FRQMXQFWLRQLWPD\EHEHQHILFLDOWRUHPRYHWKHµDFFHVVLEOHIURPWW¶FRQGLWLRQ7KHUHPD\EH
worlds in or accessible from W(t)+P which are in a distinct branch and inaccessible from W(t) 
itself, which get to be included in what is thought about when thinking of conditionalizing on P in 
order to embarrass the Distributive Principle. Extending W(t)|P in these ways would only be to my 
advantage, I think, but introduces complicating issues about + which need not be addressed for the 
success of my defence. There are also some technical issues in defining the distinction between 
W(t) and W(t)|P when P is true at the actual world. 
14
 I omit from the notation the conditioning on W(t) because it is uniform throughout so just adds 
notational clutter. 
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W(t)|¬B. Not everything true at W(t) is true at W(t)|¬B. Since in all worlds accessible from 
W(t)|¬B, ¬B is true, then A฀B is false in all such worlds, and so ¬O(A฀B) is true for 
W(t)|¬B. Likewise, both A and B are false in all the conditionally morally proper worlds 
so ¬O(A) and ¬O(B) are true at W(t)|¬B, as are O(¬A), O(¬B) and O(¬A฀¬B). So the 
unconditional obligations for W(t)|¬B mean you ought not to A.  
However, when whether B is under your control, the situation is quite different. Just 
because you are not going to bring B DERXWGRHVQ¶WPHDQWKDWQRZ\RXXQFRQGLWLRQDOO\
ought not to A, because your basis for action and therefore decision is W(t), not W(t)|¬B, 
and the difference is within your FRQWURO<RXFDQ¶WH[FXVH\RXUVHOIIURPXQFRQGLWLRQDO
obligations by substituting merely conditional obligations for unconditional ones if 
discharging the condition is under your power. For that would amount to a permanent get 
RXWRIMDLOIUHHFDUGµ\HVbut given that I GRQ¶W do what I ought today, I ought to do 
ZKDWHYHU,OLNHWRGD\DQGVLQFHDVDPDWWHURIIDFW,¶PQRWJRLQJWRGRZKDW,RXJKWWKHQ,
RXJKWWRGRZKDW,OLNHWRGD\¶ 
6RMXVWEHFDXVH\RXNQRZ\RXZRQ¶WB GRHVQ¶WPHDQLWFHDVHVWREHWKHfact that you 
RXJKWWR$7KDWUHPDLQVWUXH%XWVLQFH\RXNQRZ\RXZRQ¶WB, then your decision to act 
LVFRQGLWLRQDOLVHGRQWKDWIDFW7KDWGRHVQ¶WJHW\RXRIIWKHKRRN<RXDUHVWLOODWWKHZRUOG
W(t) and what is true there remains that you ought to A and you ought to B. Since you are 
choosing not to B you are choosing not to do what you ought, and instead have chosen to 
substitute the decision situation W(t)|¬B for the actual situation W(t). For that situation, 
there remain things that you ought or ought not to do, but making substitution, or 
mistaking such a situation for your actual situation, does not negate the truths of what you 
ought to do. Rather, this possibility of deciding on the basis of W(t)|¬B rather than W(t) is 
just a consequence of the more general problem of starting out from morally imperfect 
worlds and from uncertainty. Our decisions are conditionalised on who, when and where 
we are, and on what we know or believe, and likewise are blame and responsibility. What 
ought to be done is similarly conditionalised relative to the particular time of action in the 
morally imperfect world we inhabit. In recognising these facts it may seem that  a 
FRQVHTXHQFHLVWKDWFKRRVLQJWKHEHWWHURSWLRQJLYHQZHZRQ¶WGRZKDWZHRXJKWLPSOLHV
we ought not do what we ought. I think I have shown that to be a mere seeming driven by 
conflating the two distinct bases for action, W(t) and W(t)|¬B.  
1RZLIZHDSSO\WKLVWR%URRPH¶VREMHFWLRQLWIDLOVIRUWKHUHDVRQVMXVWJLYHQWDNLQJµ$¶
to stand for buying paint anGµB¶WRVWDQGIRUdecorating the kitchen). You ought to buy the 
paint given the actual situation at the time and so have a reason to. It is also true that at the 
conditionally morally proper worlds accessible from one LQZKLFK\RXGRQ¶WGHFRUDWHWKH
kitchen \RXGRQ¶WEuy the paint. So you ought not to buy it. But this last is in fact a 
conditional ought (O( not buy paint)| not decorate) and so does not conflict with the first 
ought, which is not conditional. Any lack of reason this entails is similarly conditional. 
Hence the example is not a counter-example to the principle of necessary inheritance used 
by the argument for Normativity of Rationality and it does not show the argument invalid 
either.  
I have gone over this very quickly. I think it is clear that the counter-examples Broome 
offers to  Logical Inheritance (Broome 2013:121), Necessary Inheritance and Ends to 
Means Transmission (Broome 2013:126) share in the pattern of the decoration example 
and so can be answered in the same way. I concede that more work would be necessary to 
establish how exactly those principles pan out in this kind of conditional deontic logic. 
Nevertheless, it is in part because of this resource that I am much more sanguine than 
Broome about the possibility of establishing true principles of the transmission of 
normativity. Such principles constitute part of the first of the two important components 
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of the argument given at the end of the last section, where arguably I made use of a 
principle of necessary inheritance. 
The main objection Broome has to the property of rationality argument is that he 
can see no satisfactory way of arguing for the premise that you ought to be 
rational....on derivative grounds (Broome 2013:202). 
We need to show thaWEHLQJUDWLRQDOµLVHIIHFWLYHDWVatisfying requirements that stem from 
RWKHUVRXUFHV¶Broome 2013:202). The dialectic is a little obscure at this point since he 
raises the contrast of a rational disposition being a best means and conjoins the point that 
it is impossible for us to have the property of rationality  with the point (deployed also 
against the direct strategy) that sometimes satisfying a rational requirement is ineffective 
because you are, for example, ill-informed.  I take it there are three separate objections 
here, the first directly against the premiss that we ought to be rational and the second  and 
third against being able to get that premiss on derivative grounds. The first is that ought 
implies can but we cannot be rational. The second is that something impossible cannot be 
a means at all. The third is that because sometimes satisfying a rational requirement is 
ineffective but satisfying all rational requirements is entailed by being rational, being 
rational cannot be the best means. 
The first two objections seem cogent to me but third does not because the best means 
need not be a perfect means. ,WPD\EHWKDW,¶PPLVVLQJVRPHWKLQJRI%URRPH¶V dialectic 
here, but in any case I agree with the conclusion that it is not true that we ought to be 
rational in this sense of rational.  
We shall now turn to the final property of rationality argument that Broome considers in 
aid of Normativity of Rationality. This is of particular interest to me because the final 
argument is similar to my outline argument for Strong Servanthood and shows how my 
argument may be embarrassed.  
The argument Broome considers is this: 
being rational entails satisfying a number of individual requirements of 
rationality that you have derivative reasons to satisfy. Surely you have some 
reason to have a property that entails your satisfying some requirements that 
you have a reason to satisfy. So « we « conclude that you have a reason to 
be rational  (Broome 2013:203) 
We then go on to infer that since you have a reason to be rational, and since logically 
necessarily if you are rational you satisfy each rational requirement, so you have a reason 
to satisfy each rational requirement. This last inference is an application of a principle of 
logical inheritance which here Broome seems to allow, presumably for the sake of 
argument given his earlier rejections of Logical Inheritance (Broome 2013:121) and a 
similar principle of transmission earlier in the same section (Broome 2013:202). 
+HUHMHFWVWKLVDUJXPHQWDVµVLPSOHWULFNHU\¶Broome 2013:203). 
The first step of the argument is to derive this conclusion [you have a reason 
to have the property of rationality] from the premise that you have a reason 
WRVDWLVI\VRPHEXWQRWDOORIWKHLQGLYLGXDOUHTXLUHPHQWV«7KHQH[WVWDJH
is to derive from this the conclusion that you have a reason to satisfy each of 
WKHLQGLYLGXDOUHTXLUHPHQWV« 
So [for example]  in two steps we derive the conclusion that you have a 
reason to satisfy [a certain requirement] from the premise that you have a 
reason to satisfy some other requirements that do not include it. Obviously 
that cannot be done. So the argument must be invalid.  
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I agree this is not valid. Let us now turn to consider how this may embarrass me.  
The strongest variety of Strong Servanthood that I think I can argue for is one in which 
ZHRXJKWWREHUDWLRQDOLQDGLIIHUHQWVHQVHIURP%URRPH¶VQDPHO\What for each instance 
of a rational requirement as it actually arises, unless we know that this is one of the 
special cases in which we ought to be irrational (e.g. Parfit 1987, Broome 2013:192), that 
rational requirement is a reason. This variety is very FORVHWR%URRPH¶VNormativity of 
Rationality. The difference is mainly that by being rational I mean something local and 
psychologically possible, conforming to each rational requirement as it actually arises, 
rather than the global but psychologically impossible property considered by Broome. 
My argument for the strongest variety of Servanthood starts from the explanation I gave 
above of why harmony makes being rational conditionally instrumental in doing what we 
ought and infers from this that generally we ought to be rational. I now make essentially 
the same kind of non-deductive inference that was the second important component of the 
argument at the end of the last section. From this generality I infer a reason to conform to 
each particular case of a rational requirement as it arises (except for special cases where 
you know you ought to be irrational).  
So my argument starts bottom up by going from derivative reasons for specific rational 
requirements (when they are instrumental in doing what we ought when we are as we 
ought to be) to a conclusion of a general obligation to conform to rationality (via 
harmony) and then back down again to saying this general obligation is itself a reason to 
conform to  each rational requirement (except for aforementioned special cases), making 
each rational requirement a reason. This means that some rational requirements which had 
no derivative reasons now have indirect reasons via the general obligation. If this is really 
ULJKWWKHQLWGRHVQ¶WHVWDEOLVKRQO\Sometimes Normative but also derivatively establishes 
Strongest Servanthood. But of course, this argument has, in outline, the same two step 
form that Broome is faulting as being simple trickery.  
I am not going to try to defend my argument at length here: rather, I shall discuss the 
dialectical situation. A great deal depends upon exactly how that outline is filled in. It 
certainly depends on the detail of the substance such as the nature of harmony and 
whether and how the merely conditional fact of harmony can go beyond explaining the 
relation of rationality to directive normativity (the weaker version of Servanthood) and 
underpin a general obligation to be rational. This also involves some kind of appeal to 
transmission of normativity from ends to means and presently, although we may be 
confident of it in specific cases, we lack a general theoretical understanding.  
It also depends on controversial principles of normative inference. In the first step it 
depends in part on a common problem in normativity, whether when certain instances of a 
type are obliged the type in general in obliged. For example, we are certainly obliged to 
stop at stop signs when not stopping would cause an accident. Does this mean in general 
we should stop at them? If we say yes, for example, because of the risk, we are appealing 
to the kind of non-deductive inference I wish to apply. The second step is the same kind of 
inference that I called the second important component in the argument at the end of the 
last section. Again, this depends on another common problem in normativity of whether 
and why, when there is a general obligation, it applies to instances in which the reasons 
for the general obligation seem not to apply. For example, in rule utilitarianism we have 
the problem of explaining why the obligation to follow the rule because in general it leads 
to best results obliges us to follow it  in specific instances where it GRHVQ¶W.  
Finally, I concede that it might be simple trickery. It is admittedly fishy since I seem to 
have bootstrapped reasons out of almost nowhere. Can a derivative general obligation to 
be rational really be, itself, a reason to conform to a rational requirement which, apart 
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from this, there is no reason to conform to? Nevertheless, if I must concede this it is not a 
disaster for me, since I can retreat to Weak Servanthood which achieves most of what I 
wish to achieve. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, %URRPH¶VDQGP\DPELWLRQVKHUHPD\EHYHU\GLIIHUHQW,FDQFHUWDLQO\
see why he might regard Weak Servanthood as a scepticism about the normativity of 
rationality (Broome 2013:204). I do not think Broome could regard Strong Servanthood as 
a scepticism and its strongest variety would achieve a great deal of what Broome wants 
for Normativity of Rationality. Nevertheless, and as we have seen, absent a good defence 
of some controversial and potentially problematic principles of normative inference, the 
argument for Strong Servanthood is incomplete.  
More generally, in his arguments against rationality being derivatively normative, 
Broome illuminates important kinds of problems for my type of position about the 
normativity of rationality, which is essentially instrumentalist. Broome considers attempts 
to defend such instrumentalism that appeal mainly to formal principles. He shows that 
such defences face serious difficulties. To my mind, in so doing he shows why any 
successful instrumentalism cannot rely only or mainly on these formal principles. We 
have seen that to rebut several of his objections I have had to appeal to the substance of 
rationality. Rebuttal alone is, of course, not a positive argument for instrumentalism. We 
have also seen in the Bayesian case something of a positive argument emerge in my 
second point. And then, at the end of the section on the argument from a rational 
disposition, I showed a positive argument that is, I think, live. So I think I have shown 
something of the potential for instrumentalism to ground a positive defence in the 
substance of rationality. I cannot show it here but I also hope I have given something of a 
flavour of the ways in which Servanthood does ground itself in that substance.  
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